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Evidence
by John E. Hall, Jr. ∗
W. Scott Henwood∗∗
and Leesa Guarnotta ∗∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Even after the seventh year since the implementation of Georgia’s
new Evidence Code, 1 Georgia’s evidence rules continue to evolve as
appellate courts face new issues and delve into more nuanced areas of
the rules. This Article details some of this evolution of the new Georgia
Evidence Code, Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) Title 24, 2
by addressing developments of Georgia's evidence rules from the period
of June 1, 2019, through May 31, 2020. Specifically, this Article addresses
(1) limitations on the attorney-client privilege; (2) admissibility of
witness testimony as it relates to late-identified witnesses, witness
competency, and co-conspirator statements; (3) the Confrontation
Clause 3 as it relates to child hearsay and non-verbal conduct; and (4)
limitations of relevant evidence as it relates to Georgia's Rape Shield Law
and evidence of victim seatbelt use in criminal trials.
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II. LIMITATIONS ON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
O.C.G.A. Section 24-5-501(a)(2) 4 codifies one of the oldest, most
sacred common law privileges—attorney-client communications.
However, in Hill, Kertscher & Wharton, LLP v. Moody, 5 the Georgia
Supreme Court expanded the existing implied waiver of the longstanding
attorney-client privilege as it relates to legal malpractice claims by
implying the waiver to those communications with attorneys not named
in the malpractice action. 6 While it is longstanding law that a client
implicitly waives the attorney-client privilege of an underlying matter
when suing for legal malpractice on that matter, Moody presented the
novel issue of whether this waiver applies to those communications with
other attorneys in the same matter whom the client chose not to sue. 7
In Moody, Daryl Moody and two associated businesses (collectively
referred to as "Moody") obtained Hill, Kertsher & Wharton, LLP's (HKW)
advice regarding the termination of the president of a company Moody
recently invested in. HKW also represented Moody in a suit initiated by
the former president in California following his termination. During this
representation, HKW failed, inter alia, to assert a lack of personal
jurisdiction defense as requested by Moody. Subsequently, Moody
retained Holland & Knight LLP (Holland & Knight), a firm that also
handled Moody's corporate work, to disqualify HKW from the California
action and assume representation of Moody following HKW's dismissal.
Ultimately, the trial court ruled in favor of the former president in the
California suit. This ruling led to the present legal malpractice action
against HKW, in which Moody failed to name Holland & Knight as a
party. 8
In defense to the legal malpractice allegations, HKW stated that
Moody directed HKW to follow Holland & Knight's instructions prior to
the initiation of the disqualification action. Accordingly, HKW served a
non-party request for production of documents on Holland & Knight
regarding Holland & Knight’s work for Moody as it related to Moody's
corporate matters, the disqualification suit, and the California suit. Both
Holland & Knight and Moody objected to this request on the basis of
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. HKW responded by
arguing that Moody implicitly waived any attorney-client privilege with
respect to all counsel involved in the underlying matter, including
Holland & Knight. The trial court agreed with HKW, but granted

O.C.G.A. § 24-5-501(a)(2) (2020).
308 Ga. 74, 839 S.E.2d 535 (2020).
6 Id. at 74, 839 S.E.2d at 536.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 74–75, 839 S.E.2d at 536–37.
4
5
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Moody's request for a certificate of immediate review. 9 On appeal, the
Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision stating that
“the Supreme Court of Georgia has indicated implied waivers of the
attorney/client privilege should be narrowly drawn.” 10 The court of
appeals noted that although both Holland & Knight and HKW
represented Moody in the matters underlying the present legal
malpractice action, Holland & Knight was retained after HKW's alleged
malfeasance. Accordingly, there was no basis for waiver of Moody and
Holland & Knight's attorney-client privilege. 11
After a grant of certiorari, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the
Georgia Court of Appeals’ holding. 12 The court stated that the appellate
court erred in rejecting the trial court’s finding that Holland & Knight
represented Moody in connection with the corporate actions, the
disqualification action, and the California suit. 13 Given Holland &
Knight's involvement with all three matters, it is possible its actions may
have affected the causation, reliance, and damages necessary for Moody’s
legal malpractice action. Thus, the court determined that, despite failing
to name Holland & Knight as a party, Moody waived the attorney-client
privilege as to Holland & Knight as well. 14 To hold otherwise would allow
a client to “use as a sword the protection which the Legislature awarded
them as a shield.” 15
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF WITNESS TESTIMONY
A. Late-Identified Witnesses
In Lee v. Smith, 16 the Georgia Supreme Court overruled the Georgia
Court of Appeals' holding in Moore v. Cottrell, 17 which affirmed a trial
court’s exclusion of expert testimony based solely on the late
identification of the expert. 18 In doing so, the court enumerated, for the
Id. at 75–76, 839 S.E.2d at 537–38.
Moody v. Hill, Kertscher & Wharton, LLP, 346 Ga. App. 129–30, 813 S.E.2d 790,91
(2018).
11 Hill, Kertscher & Wharton, LLP, 308 Ga. at 77, 839 S.E.2d at 538.
12 Id. at 81, 839 S.E.2d at 540–41.
13 Id. at 80, 839 S.E.2d at 540.
14 Id. at 79, 839 S.E.2d at 536–40.
15 Id. (quoting Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wash.2d 198, 208, 787 P.2d 30, 36 (1990)).
16 307 Ga. 815, 838 S.E.2d 870 (2020).
17334 Ga. App. 791, 780 S.E.2d 442 (2015).
18 In Moore, following the deadline for expert disclosure pursuant to a consent case
management order, Defendant Cottrell successfully moved to exclude Plaintiffs Dennis and
Lisa Moore's expert. Cottrell then moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs opposed this
motion with the affidavit of a different expert. The trial court struck the new expert's
affidavit as untimely and granted the summary judgement motion. 334 Ga. App. at 792,
9

10
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first time, the factors trial courts must consider prior to witness
exclusion. 19
In Lee, the plaintiff disclosed a new expert on plaintiff’s newly stated
future lost earnings claim on the final day for witness disclosure as set
by the scheduling order. A week later, Lee identified his anticipated
rebuttal witness. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court excluded Lee’s
rebuttal expert’s testimony based on Lee’s failure to identify the witness
as required by the scheduling order. Lee argued that his failure to comply
with the scheduling order was a result of Smith’s failure to identify his
witnesses until the last day allowed by the scheduling order.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion. 20
The supreme court granted certiorari and reversed the appellate
court’s decision. 21 The court acknowledged a trial court’s discretion to set
deadlines and sanction a party for noncompliance with these deadlines. 22
Notwithstanding, the court noted that trial courts may not impose
harsher sanctions than necessary to vindicate the court's authority. 23 To
determine whether a sanction is appropriate, the court looked to other
jurisdictions to establish the factors a trial court must consider before
excluding a late-identified witness. 24 After this review, the court
determined trial courts should consider
(1) the explanation for the failure to disclose the witness, (2) the
importance of the testimony, (3) the prejudice to the opposing party if
the witness is allowed to testify, and (4) whether a less harsh remedy
than the exclusion of the witness would be sufficient to ameliorate the
prejudice and vindicate the trial court’s authority. 25

B. Witness Competency
In Little v. Jim-Lar Corporation, 26 the Georgia Court of Appeals
addressed, for the first time specifically under Georgia law, the effect a
guardianship proceeding has on a witness’s competency under Georgia’s
new Evidence Code. In Little, both Myra Little and her guardian and
conservator brought an action for negligence after Little suffered an
allergic reaction when Defendant, Jim-Lar Corporation, served Little
780 S.E.2d at 445. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's rulings by citing to the
expert disclosure deadline set out in the scheduling order. Id. at 794, 780 S.E.2d at 446.
19 Lee, 307 Ga. at 824, 838 S.E.2d 877.
20 Id. at 815–20, 838 S.E.2d at 873–76.
21 Id. at 820, 838 S.E.2d at 875.
22 Id. at 820–21, 838 S.E.2d at 875.
23 Id. at 821, 838 S.E.2d at 875.
24 Id. at 823, 838 S.E.2d at 877.
25 Id. at 824, 838 S.E.2d at 877.
26 352 Ga. App. 764, 835 S.E.2d 794 (2019).
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peach pie instead of apple pie. In a verified response to Defendant’s
interrogatories, Little, not her guardian, provided a description of the
incident. However, the trial court did not consider Little’s verified
responses in adjudicating Jim-Lar Corporation’s summary judgment
motion. Instead, the trial court found the responses inadmissible due to
Little’s incompetence. On appeal, Little argued that the trial court
improperly excluded her interrogatory responses as she had not yet
received a guardian and, accordingly, was not incompetent at the time of
verification. 27
In affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals noted that
the requirement for appointment of a guardian under O.C.G.A.
§ 29-4-1(a) 28 is that the court determines “the adult lacks sufficient
capacity to make or communicate significant responsible decisions
concerning his or her health or safety.” 29 However, this is not the
standard used to determine whether an individual is a competent witness
under the Evidence Code. Rather the court referred to O.C.G.A.
§ 24-6-601, 30 which states that “every person is competent to be a
witness.” 31 Further, the court referred to federal precedent that allows
even those individuals who are not mentally competent to testify. 32 In
such circumstances, the rules rely on jurors to evaluate the witness’s
testimony. 33
Despite the general competency rule created by O.C.G.A. § 24-6-601,
the court noted that a trial court has the discretion to rule a witness
incapable of testifying. 34 This authority is independent of a separate
guardianship proceeding, regardless of which stage of the proceeding the
witnesses are at when they offer their testimony. 35 Accordingly, without
a transcript of the trial court’s hearing on Little’s competency, the court
of appeals affirmed the exclusion of Little's interrogatory responses. 36
C. Statements of a Co-Conspirator
In Womack v. State, 37 the Georgia Court of Appeals answered another
question of first impression—whether the subsequent acquittal of a
Id. at 764–66, 835 S.E.2d at 795–97.
O.C.G.A. § 29-4-1(a) (2019).
29 Id.
30 O.C.G.A. § 24-6-601 (2019).
31 Id. (emphasis added).
32 Little, 352 Ga. App. at 766, 835 S.E.2d 797.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 353 Ga. App. 801, 840 S.E.2d 41 (2020).
27
28
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co-conspirator who made hearsay statements retroactively affects a
co-defendant's trial. 38 Ultimately, the court answered this question in the
negative. 39
Womack is the result of an alleged armed robbery by Xavier Womack,
Jakeith Robinson, and Leon Tollette that ended in the death of a security
guard. Tollette pleaded guilty to several charges and was sentenced to
death. Robinson was then acquitted of malice murder, felony murder, and
aggravated assault; however, the jury did not reach a verdict on the
remaining armed robbery and firearm charges. Robinson was re-tried
with Womack. 40 At trial, Robinson’s girlfriend testified that Robinson
stated, “[W]e just tried to rob a Brinks truck and someone was shot and
[Tollette] got caught.” 41 Both Womack and Robinson were found guilty of
armed robbery alone. After trial, Robinson’s armed robbery conviction
was reversed on the grounds of collateral estoppel and issue preclusion.
Following this reversal, Womack filed an extraordinary motion for a new
trial, arguing Robinson’s statements should not have been admitted
against him as Robinson was not a co-conspirator. The trial court denied
this motion based on precedent from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. 42 The court of appeals then granted Womack’s
application for discretionary appeal. 43
On appeal, the court applied the co-conspirator hearsay exception as
it appeared at the time of trial, which stated, “[a]fter the fact of
conspiracy is proved, the declarations by any one of the conspirators
during the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against
all.” 44 Next, the court adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in United
States v. Hernandez-Miranda, 45 which stated, “the admission of
testimony under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is not
rendered retroactively improper by subsequent acquittal of the alleged
co-conspirator.” 46 Moreover, the court cited the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in
United States v. Cravero, 47 which stated that even where a co-conspirator
is acquitted prior to the present co-conspirator’s trial, the co-conspirator’s
statement is admissible provided the state “establishes a prima facie case
of the existence of a conspiracy and introduces . . . slight evidence” of
Id. at 805, 840 S.E.2d at 45.
Id. at 806, 840 S.E.2d at 46.
40 Id. at 801, 840 S.E.2d at 43.
41 Id. at 802, 840 S.E.2d at 43 (alterations in original) (quoting Womack v. State, 273 Ga.
App. 300, 302, 614 S.E.2d 909, 912 (2005)).
42 Id. at 801–04, 840 S.E.2d at 43–45.
43 Id. at 804, 840 S.E.2d at 45.
44 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-3-5 (2010)).
45 78 F.3d 512 (11th Cir. 1996).
46 Id. at 513 (quoting United States v. Kincade, 714 F.2d 1064–65 (11th Cir. 1983)).
47 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976).
38
39

2020]

EVIDENCE

123

connection between the declarant and the defendant. 48 Accordingly, the
court of appeals affirmed the denial of Womack’s extraordinary motion
for new trial. 49
Despite the court’s reliance on the 1999 co-conspirator hearsay
exception, the holding in Womack is instructive to cases under Georgia’s
new Evidence Code as the Code provides a less stringent standard for
prosecutors since a “conspiracy need not be charged” for a statement to
be admissible as a statement by a co-conspirator. 50
IV. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. Child Hearsay
In contrast to cases analyzed in last year's Article which emphasized
the need for attorneys to rely on Georgia’s new Evidence Code, 51 the
Georgia Court of Appeals interpreted the child hearsay rule and its
enforceability pursuant to the Confrontation Clause under the former
rule established in Georgia's old Evidence Code in Allison v. State. 52
In Allison, Defendant Brandon James Allison was convicted of child
molestation, enticing a child for indecent purposes, and false
imprisonment. At trial, the trial court admitted a video recording of the
child victim's interview into evidence. The interview, which was
conducted prior to any criminal charges, provided details of the event
that the six-year-old child could not recall during her trial testimony. In
fact, the child did not recall the subject of the interview. Nevertheless,
the child testified that she knew why she was in the courtroom, and that
she understood the need to tell the truth. Defendant Allison declined any
cross-examination. After his conviction, Allison appealed arguing that
the video interview was improperly admitted since, given the child’s
inability or unwillingness to remember, the court should have found the
child “unavailable” pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804. 53 O.C.G.A.
§ 24-8-804 stands for the general proposition that, unless the statement
fits into the exceptions enumerated by the Rule or may be admissible
under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803, 54 an out of court statement used for the truth
of the matter asserted is inadmissible where the declarant is

Id. at 418–19.
Womack, 353 Ga. App. at 806, 840 S.E.2d at 46.
50 O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(E) (2020).
51 71 MERCER L. REV. 103 (2019).
52 356 Ga. App. 256, 846 S.E.2d 222 (2020).
53 Id. at 256–58, 846 S.E.2d at 225–26 (citing O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804 (2019)).
54 O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803 (2020).
48
49
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unavailable. 55 A declarant is “unavailable” pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 24-8-804 when the declarant:
(1) Is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement;
(2) Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the
declarant’s statement despite an order of the court to do so;
(3) Testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant’s
statement;
(4) Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death
or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the statement has
been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance or, in the case of
exceptions under paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b) of this Code
section, the declarant’s attendance or testimony, by process or other
reasonable means. 56

In rejecting Allison's argument, the Georgia Court of Appeals noted
that Allison’s hearsay argument was, in actuality, an argument under
the Confrontation Clause. 57 In addressing the issue of whether Allison
had an opportunity to confront the evidence against him, the court cited
to O.C.G.A. § 24-8-820(a) 58 that states:
A statement made by a child younger than 16 years of age describing
any act of sexual contact or physical abuse performed with or on such
child by another . . . shall be admissible in evidence by the testimony
of the person to whom made if the proponent of such statement
provides notice to the adverse party prior to trial of the intention to
use such out-of-court statement and such child testifies at the trial,
unless the adverse party forfeits or waives such child’s testimony as
provided in this title, and, at the time of the testimony regarding the
out-of-court statements, the person to whom the child made such
statement is subject to cross-examination regarding the out-of-court
statements. 59

The court further stated that the testimony required by O.C.G.A.
§ 24-8-820(a) is not subject to O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804’s definition of

O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804 (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804 (2019).
57 356 Ga. App. at 259, 846 S.E.2d at 226.
58 O.C.G.A. § 24-8-820(a) (2019).
59 Id.
55
56
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unavailability. 60 Rather, O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804’s definition is limited to
those instances in which a litigant seeks to introduce hearsay from an
unavailable witness. 61
Thus, without a statutory definition or specific federal equivalent of
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-820(a), the court of appeals turned to case law from
Georgia’s old Evidence Code. 62 Pursuant to this precedent, a child is
“available” whenever the child takes the stand regardless of the child’s
response. 63 Here, since the child took the stand and Allison had an
opportunity to cross-examine the child, there was no violation of the
Confrontation Clause. 64
B. Adult Non-Verbal Conduct
The Georgia Court of Appeals returned to reliance on the Federal
Rules of Evidence in State v. Gilmore, 65 wherein the court held, for the
first time specifically under Georgia law, that nonverbal conduct can be
considered a statement. 66
In Gilmore, the State tendered video of an informant purchasing
methamphetamine from Gilmore. The informant, who obtained the video
using a video camera attached to his key ring, committed suicide prior to
Gilmore’s trial. Thus, a police officer testified as to the video’s reliability.
The trial court determined that the movements in the video were
nonverbal testimonial statements and excluded the video in accordance
with the Confrontation Clause. 67
On appeal, the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s decision,
noting that the informant’s unavailability was undisputed. 68 After citing
to case law supporting Federal Rule 801’s definition of a statement as
including assertive, nonverbal conduct, the court determined that the
informant’s actions at the request of police were clearly intended to show
that Gilmore was selling methamphetamine. 69 Thus, the video was a
statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 70 The court
continued that because the informant’s movements were knowingly and
purposely made to confirm police suspicion, and because a reasonable
Allison, 356 Ga. App. 258, 846 S.E.2d at 226.
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804 (2019).
62 Allison, 356 Ga. App. 258, 846 S.E.2d at 226.
63 Id. at 259, 846 S.E.2d at 227.
64 Id. at 260, 846 S.E.2d at 227.
65 355 Ga. App. 536, 844 S.E.2d 877 (2020).
66 Id. at 538–39, 844 S.E.2d at 880.
67 Id. at 536–37, 844 S.E.2d at 878.
68 Id. at 539, 844 S.E.2d at 879.
69 Id. at 538–39, 844 S.E.2d at 880.
70 Id. at 539, 844 S.E.2d at 880.
60
61
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witness might believe the informants actions were going to be used
against Gilmore at trial, the video was testimonial in nature subject to
the Confrontation Clause. 71
V. LIMITATIONS OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE
A. Georgia's Rape Shield Law
In accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s eye toward
admissibility, Georgia’s Rape Shield Law under the new Evidence Code,
although not adopted from the federal Rule, provides three additional
exceptions to the general exclusion of evidence of a sexual assault victim’s
past sexual behavior. 72 Conversely, in State v. Burns, 73 the Supreme
Court of Georgia limited the admissibility of such evidence by overruling
Smith v. State’s 74 rule requiring admissibility of such evidence where the
evidence is of prior false accusations by the victim and adopting a
traditional balancing test approach. 75
In Burns, the appellant was convicted of incest, aggravated sodomy,
and aggravated sexual battery after the discovery of the victim’s social
media message detailing the encounter. At trial, Burns proffered
evidence of another statement by the victim alleging that her brother’s
best friend tried to rape her, which the victim later admitted was a lie.
Burns argued that the Rape Shield Statute did not protect evidence of
previous false accusations of sexual abuse because such false accusations
pertain to the witness’ credibility. The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed
with Burns and reversed the trial court’s order excluding the evidence

Id. at 540, 844 S.E.2d at 880–81.
Under the previous rule, O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, evidence of a victim’s past sexual behavior
was only admissible if it was “directly involved the participation of the accused and [the
court] finds that the evidence expected to be introduced supports an inference that the
accused could have reasonably believed that the complaining witness consented to the
conduct complained of in the prosecution.” Under the new Rape Shield Law, codified at
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-412, in addition to the exception under the previous rule, evidence of past
sexual behavior is also admissible where it provides:
(1) Evidence of specific instances of a victim's or complaining witness's sexual
behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the
source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence;
...
(3) Evidence of specific instances of a victim's or complaining witness's sexual
behavior with respect to the defendant or another person if offered by the
prosecutor; and
(4) Evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant's constitutional rights.
73 306 Ga. 117, 829 S.E.2d 367 (2019).
74 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989).
75 Burns, 306 Ga. at 125, 829 S.E.2d at 374 (2019).
71
72
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citing to the Smith holding that a false allegation of sexual misconduct
does not involve the victim's past sexual history. 76
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court criticized the court of appeals’
holding and described the Smith decision as overly broad and lacking
nuance. 77 The court further explained that the Smith holding is based on
an interpretation of the Sixth 78 and Fourteenth Amendments 79 that was
improper. 80 Rather, despite the Confrontation Clause and Due Process
Clause, 81 a defendant does not have “an unfettered right to offer
testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible
under standard rules of evidence.” 82
Thus, the court held that the traditional balancing test could be done
to determine whether such evidence ought to be allowed in. 83 Under the
traditional balancing test, the court would weigh the danger of unfair
prejudice and the evidence’s probative value to determine if the evidence
should be admitted. 84
B. Seatbelt Use in a Criminal Trial
In State v. Mondor, 85 the Georgia Supreme Court held, as a matter of
first impression, that evidence that the victim was not wearing a seatbelt
at the time of an accident is not relevant evidence to prove causation in
a criminal trial. 86
In Mondor, the respondent was driving on Highway 75 in Marietta,
Georgia when he collided with another vehicle causing a multi-car
collision that resulted in the victim’s death. The victim was not wearing
a safety belt and was ejected from the vehicle after it overturned on the
highway. Mondor was charged with first-degree vehicular manslaughter
predicated upon a hit-and-run offense. Mondor, in a pre-trial motion,
argued that the victim’s failure to wear a seatbelt should be admissible
as evidence at trial because the statutory bar on such evidence was
unconstitutional. He argued that the statute’s bar on seatbelt use

76 Burns v. State, 345 Ga. App. 822, 824, 813 S.E.2d 425, 426 (2018), reconsideration
denied (May 21, 2018), cert. granted (Nov. 15, 2018), aff'd but criticized, 306 Ga. 117, 829
S.E.2d 367 (2019).
77 See Burns, 306 Ga. at 122–23, 829 S.E.2d at 373.
78 U.S. CONST amend. VI.
79 U.S. CONST amend. XIV.
80 Burns, 306 Ga. at 121, 829 S.E.2d at 372.
81 U.S. CONST amend. XIV, § 1.
82 Burns, 306 Ga. at 122, 829 S.E.2d at 372.
83 Id. at 125–26, 829 S.E.2d at 375.
84 Id. at 125, 829 S.E.2d at 375.
85 306 Ga. 338, 830 S.E.2d 206 (2019).
86 Id. at 350, 830 S.E.2d at 216.
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evidence prevented him from putting on a full defense at trial. The trial
court declined to except Mondor from the bar on seatbelt use evidence. 87
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court examined, for the first time,
whether the seatbelt use evidence was relevant to causation in a criminal
trial. 88 As an initial matter, the court noted that if the evidence was not
relevant, then there was no reason to confront the constitutional
challenge. 89 Next, the court turned to Georgia’s law on proximate
causation in a criminal case to determine that a victim’s failure to wear
a seatbelt in the present case was not an intervening cause. 90
Accordingly, a victim’s failure to wear a seatbelt is generally irrelevant
to causation in a criminal case. 91 Thus, the court affirmed the exclusion
of Mondor’s evidence that the victim was not wearing a seatbelt. 92
VI. CONCLUSION
As Georgia's appellate courts traverse nuanced areas of the new
Evidence Code, this survey period shows that, even in the face of
Constitutional challenges, Georgia’s courts will continue to interpret
evidentiary rules with an eye towards admissibility. Only time will tell
whether the courts will become more liberal in the admission of evidence
in the wake of COVID-19-related bench trials.

Id. at 338–39, 830 S.E.2d at 209.
Id. at 346–48, 830 S.E.2d at 213–15. The court noted that the Georgia Court of Appeals
has case law on this point, but that the issue was new to the Georgia Supreme Court. Id.
at 348, 830 S.E.2d at 215.
89 Id. at 350, 830 S.E.2d at 216.
90 Id. at 349, 830 S.E.2d at 215–16.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 349, 830 S.E.2d at 216.
87
88

